This paper analyses price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short term cost function in the second stage of the game.
Introduction.
the production factors is certainly the central hypothesis of our approach. On the one hand, it is a standard hypothesis in economic analysis, a textbook case renewing the Marshallian tradition of distinguishing between short and long term cost functions. On the other hand, as far as we know, it appears that it has not been used in the recent literature about price competition. However, we want to point out that this assumption is a natural generalization of the notion of capacity constraints initiated by Edgeworth (1925) . There is a long tradition in Industrial Organization of considering firms that are capacity constrained (Vives, 1980; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Allen and Hellwig, 1986; Davidson and Deneckere, 1986; Allen et al., 2000) . In those models, the constraint is drastic (i.e. it is impossible to produce above the capacity). In our model, the choice of the fixed factor corresponds to the choice of the production capacity. But the usual way to model capacity constraints is equivalent, in our setting, with an assumption of perfect complementarity of fixed and variable factors. In this case, when the capacity of production is binding in the second stage, it is impossible to produce more, whatever the quantity of variable factor. Our hypothesis of substitutability between fixed and . 3. Firms have to supply all the demand they face. The demand function is defined as follows:
We can now express the profit π i for each firm i.
The functionπ(p, z i ) represents the profit of the firm i when both firms quote the same price and the function π(p, z i ), represents the profit of firm i when it quotes the lowest price and supplies the market alone.
In the second stage, the fixed cost, w 1 z i , is sunk, and the firm will quote a price only if the variable part of the profit is positive i. e.π(p, z i ) ≥ −w 1 z i . Thus, we also definê
given z i , the minimum price compatible with a decision to produce in the second stage.
Finally, we define p * i , the price that maximises the profit of firm i when both firms operate in the market. As a shortcut, this price can be interpreted as the cartel price when both firms have chosen the same level of fixed factors in the first stage.
, the monopoly price which maximises the profit of a firm alone in the market.
In the rest of the paper, when reasoning with a given z i , we will denoteπ(p,
It is important to understand how those profit functionsπ(p, z i ) and π(p, z i ) and those pricesp, p * andp are organized together.
Lemma 1 (Geometry of profit functions for a given z i ).
Proof : Following equations (1), (2) and (3), (4a), (4b), (4c) are obvious. Taking the total differential of expressions (1), (2) and (3), we can show that ∀z, dp(z)/dz < 0, dp(z)/dz < 0 and dp
The pricesp(z) and p * (z) will play an important role in the resolution of the game and we have to settle the question of their relative position.
Lemma 2 (Comparison betweenp(z) and p * (z)).
Proof : in the appendix.
z is exogenous, only determined by the special form of the demand and production functions. If the firm chooses a level of z lower thanz, thenp(z) will be above p * (z).
However, if the firm chooses a higher level, thenp(z) will be lower than p * (z). So when solving the first stage of the game, z will be endogenous, and we have to keep in mind the qualitative implications for the resolution of the second stage. For a given demand function, α is the sole determinant ofp position. When α tends to 1, the condition (5-b) is more easily satisfied. 
The second stage of the game: price competition
In this section, we take the firms' fixed input levels as given and look for the Nash equilibrium in prices. Thus, to simplify the exposition, we omit the z variable when denoting the price. For reasons that will become clearer when we resolve the first stage of the game in the next section, we will consider the possibility that z 1 and z 2 , chosen in the first stage, can be different but "not too much". More precisely, we will assume
Nash Equilibria
Proposition 1. In the second stage, (p 1 , p 2 ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and
Proof : in the appendix
The Nash equilibrium prediction in the second stage game is basically the one of Dastidar (1995) , with the same drawback. With the exception of the very special casep i =p j , in which there is a unique Nash equilibrium, all the other cases are characterized by an infinite number of equilibria, with a minimum zero short-term profit equilibrium price and a maximum above the competitive price.
Equilibrium selection
In this subsection, we will use payoff dominance criterion to reduce the set of equilibria and discuss the uniqueness problem. An equilibrium point is said to be payoff-dominant if it is not strictly dominated by an other equilibrium point, i.e. there exists no other equilibrium in which payoffs are higher for all players. 
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Stage 2: Uniqueness
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Stage 2: Multiplicity
Stage 2: Uniqueness The payoff dominance criterion is insufficient to achieve the solution's uniqueness in the second stage. The corollary 2-C shows that the coordination problem (multiplicity of equilibria) follows from the profits geometry. But the corollary 2-A shows that the coordination problem may be solved in the endogenous way by the agents' decisions upstream, whatever the special values of the parameters.
The first stage of the game
In this section, firms determine their level of fixed factors anticipating the effect on the price equilibria at the second stage of the game. As we are in price competition, the profit function of the first stage of the game inherits the potential discontinuity of the profit function in the second stage of the game. Thus, for each outcome of the game, we will have to look for the consequences of unilateral deviation in z on the profit function. Two problems may arise. First, we have to consider the potential asymmetry between the effect of a deviation in z on the market price, i.e. it is the fixed factor level of the firm with the highest one that alone determines the market price. Secondly, a deviation in the level of the fixed factors can also modify the nature of the equilibrium
Π(z) characterizes the profit function of both firm when they choose the same level of fixed factor. When z z, it also characterizes the profit of the firm with the highest level of fixed factor.
Lemma 3 (Geometry of the profit function)
.
Proof : (6a) is obtained by taking the total differential of the definition. For (6b) and (6c), we use the fact that p * (z) maximiseπ(p, z) for a given z. (6d) is straightforward.
The relative position of z * and z * * , on the one hand, withz, on the other hand, will depend on the property of the demand function and the value of the elasticity of the production according to the level of the fixed factor (the parameter α). We
The collusive nature of the equilibrium
We define the collusive outcome as the solution of the joint-profit maximization program of two firms equally sharing the production. Because it is impossible for firms to legally enforce an explicit agreement, we add a constraint of non-profitable deviation.
This program can be written:
As a simple application of the envelope theorem, and because of the geometry of the profit function, the results are as follows. When the constraint is binding, the solution of joint-profit maximization problem is (z * ,p(z * )), which corresponds to a second best from the point of view of the firms. When the constraint is slack, (z * * , p * (z * * )) is the solution, corresponding to the cartel capacity and price.
Thus, the unique equilibrium prediction of the whole game corresponds to a collusive outcome. Our model provides a setting in which tacit collusion occurs in the sense of Ivaldi et al. (2003) , and this result is obtain in a non-repeated two-stage game interaction. It is not the possibility of retaliation that drives the existence of tacit collusion.
Dastidar (2001) has discussed the possibility for the collusive outcome to be a Nash equilibrium of Bertand competition in a single-shot game. This paper goes further. Not only because we prove that our solution is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, but also because, combining a clear mechanism of equilibrium selection with a sequential choice of production factors with soft capacity constraint, we show that tacit collusion is the only predictable outcome of the whole game.
Conclusion
Our objective was to provide an example of a market in which tacit collusion can be obtained as a predictable result of a non-repeated framework. To do this, we have built a model with assumptions very close to the canonical textbook model of Bertrand competition: price competition, non-repeated interaction, homogeneity, constant returns to scale. Our only departure from this setting is that we rely on a two-factor production function chosen sequentially.
The conventional wisdom, based on Bertrand's original result, is to believe that price competition is a much more drastic form of competition than quantity. Even if there are few firms in the market, Bertrand's result shows that some form of imperfect competition can lead to marginal cost pricing and thus to social optimality. Since Edgeworth (1925) , there has been a long-standing debate on this statement. By bridging two important lines of this literature distinguished by Vives (1999) , the BertrandEdgeworth approach with capacity constraints, and that of convex costs (Dastidar, 1995) , our paper is also a contribution to the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox.
An interesting property of our approach with a two-factor production function is that it disentangles any assumption about returns to scale from the convexity of marginal cost in the second stage. A natural extension of this paper would be to consider a more general form of the production function with possibly various types of returns-to-scale. This generalization would certainly be the proper framework to study the effect of the number of firms at the equilibrium and particularly the way this interacts with the mechanism of coordination in the first stage. Dastidar (2001) has shown that, when costs are convex, the effect of the number of firms can be very counter-intuitive, because the cost penalty incurred by a firm unilaterally lowering its price is increased when more firms operate in the market. Obviously, in our two-stage approach, the number of firms will also have an influence on the equilibrium value of the fixed factor, and thus on the geometry of the profit function. Those effects will not necessarily be trivial, especially if we consider various production functions and various returns to scale. A related point is the influence of fixed costs on the equilibrium's existence as discussed recently by Saporiti and Coloma (2010), Dastidar (2011a) and Dastidar (2011b). In our model, the cost of the fixed factor can be interpreted as a fixed cost in the second stage. But, because this cost is sunk, it will have no effect on the existence of the equilibrium.
payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibria.
all symmetric profiles corresponding to those prices are Nash equilibria, with the profit of both firms varying in the opposite way.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3
For a purpose of readability, we will denote by the subscript h the firm with the highest level of fixed factor, by the subscript l the one with the lowest level (i.e. z 2 ) ). Let's start by demonstrating Proposition 3 i).
Step 1: Asymmetric strategy profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first stage game. Step 2: (z * , z * ) is a Nash Equilibrium of the first stage game.
If a firm unilaterally decide to increase its level of fixed factor to z + > z * , it will become the only firm with the high level of fixed factor. Its profit will be Π * (z + ). But, because 
